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Abstract
We consider the problem of two wireless networks operating on the same (presum-
ably unlicensed) frequency band. Pairs within a given network cooperate to schedule
transmissions, but between networks there is competition for spectrum. To make
the problem tractable, we assume transmissions are scheduled according to a random
access protocol where each network chooses an access probability for its users. A
game between the two networks is defined. We characterize the Nash Equilibrium
behavior of the system. Three regimes are identified; one in which both networks
simultaneously schedule all transmissions; one in which the denser network schedules
all transmissions and the sparser only schedules a fraction; and one in which both
networks schedule only a fraction of their transmissions. The regime of operation
depends on the pathloss exponent α, the latter regime being desirable, but attainable
only for α > 4. This suggests that in certain environments, rival wireless networks
may end up naturally cooperating. To substantiate our analytical results, we simulate
a system where networks iteratively optimize their access probabilities in a greedy
manner. We also discuss a distributed scheduling protocol that employs carrier sens-
ing, and demonstrate via simulations, that again a near cooperative equilibrium exists
for sufficiently large α.
1 Introduction
The recent proliferation of networks operating on unlicensed bands, most notably 802.11
and Bluetooth, has stimulated research into the study of how different systems competing
for the same spectrum interact. Communication on unlicensed spectrum is desirable es-
sentially because it is free, but users are subject to random interference generated by the
transmissions of other users. Most research to date has assumed devices have no natural
incentive to cooperate with one another. For instance, a wireless router in one apartment
is not concerned about the interference it generates in a neighboring apartment. Follow-
ing from this assumption, various game-theoretic formulations have been used to model
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the interplay between neighboring systems [16], [4], [1], [5], [12]. An important conclu-
sion stemming from this body of work is that for single-stage games the Nash Equilibria
(N.E.) are typically unfavorable, resulting in inefficient allocations of resources to users. A
quintessential example is the following. Consider a system where a pair of competing links
is subjected to white-noise and all cross-gains are frequency-flat. Suppose the transmitters
wish to select a one-time power allocation across frequency subject to a constraint on the
total power expended (this problem is studied in [15], [2], [3] where it is referred to as the
Gaussian Interference Game). It is straightforward to reason (via a waterfilling argument)
that the selection by both users of frequency-flat power allocations, each occupying the
entire band, constitutes a N.E.. This full spread power allocation can be extremely ineffi-
cient. Consider a symmetric system where the cross-gains and direct-gains are equal. At
high SNR each link achieves a throughput of only 1 b/s/Hz, instead of 1
2
log2(1 + SNR)
b/s/Hz, which would be obtained if the links cooperated by occupying orthogonal halves
of the spectrum. At an SNR of 30 dB, the throughput ratio between cooperative behavior
and this full spread N.E. behavior, referred to as the price of anarchy, is about 5. This
example highlights an important point in relation to single-stage games between competing
wireless links: users typically have an incentive to occupy all of the available resources.
In this work a different approach is taken. Rather than assuming total anarchy, that
is, competition between all wireless links, we instead assume competition only between
wireless links belonging to different networks. Wireless links belonging to the same network
are assumed to cooperate. In short, we assume competition on the network level, not on
the link level. In a practical setting this may represent the fact that neighboring wireless
systems are produced by the same manufacturer, or are administered by the same network
operator. Alternatively one may view the competition as being between coalitions of users
[13].
To make the problem analytically tractable but still retain its underlying mechanics,
we assume each network operates under a random-access protocol, where users from a
given network access the channel independently but with the same probability. Analysis
of random access protocols provides intuition for the behavior of systems operating under
more complex protocols, as the access probability can broadly be interpreted as the average
degrees of freedom each user occupies. For the case of competition on the link level, game-
theoretic research of random-access protocols such as ALOHA have been conducted in
[14] and [11]. In our model each network has a different density of nodes and chooses
its access probability to maximize average throughput per user. Note this access protocol
is essentially identical to one in which users select a random fraction of the spectrum on
which to communicate. Thus an access probability of one corresponds to a full spread
power allocation.
We first assume all links in the system have the same transmission range and after-
wards show that the results are only trivially modified if each link is assumed to have an
i.i.d. random transmission range. We characterize the N.E. of this system for a fixed-rate
model, where all users transmit at the same data rate. We show that unlike the case of
competing links, a N.E. always exists and is unique. Furthermore for a large range of typ-
ical parameter values, the N.E. is not full spread —nodes in at least one network occupy
only a fraction of the bandwidth. We also identify two modes, delineated by the pathloss
exponent α. For α > 4, the N.E. behavior is distinctly different than for α < 4 and
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possesses pseudo-cooperative properties. Following this we show that the picture for the
variable-rate model, in which users individually tailor their transmission rates to match the
instantaneous channel capacity, remains unchanged. Before concluding we present simula-
tion results for the behavior of the system when the networks employ a greedy algorithm to
optimize their throughput, operating under both a random access protocol, and a carrier
sensing protocol.
In section II we formulate the system model explicitly. In section III.A we introduce the
random access protocol and analyze its N.E. behavior in the fixed-rate model. In section
III.B we analyze the variable-rate model. In section IV we extend our results to cover the
case of variable transmission ranges. Section V presents simulation results and the carrier
sensing protocol. Section VI summarizes and suggests extensions. Section VII contains
proofs of the main theorems presented.
2 Problem Setup
Consider two wireless networks consisting of nλ1 and nλ2 tx-rx pairs, respectively. Without
loss of generality we will assume λ1 ≤ λ2. The transmitting nodes are uniformly distributed
at random in an area of size n. To avoid boundary effects suppose this area is the surface
of a sphere. Thus λi is the density of transmitters (or receivers) in network i. For each
transmitter, the corresponding receiver is initially assumed to be located at a fixed range
of d meters with uniform random bearing. Time is slotted and all users are assumed to be
time synchronized.
Both networks operate on the same band of (presumably unlicensed) spectrum and
at each time slot a subset of tx-rx pairs are simultaneously scheduled in each network.
When scheduled a tx-rx pair uses all of the spectrum. It is generally desirable to schedule
neighboring tx-rx pairs in different time slots. This scheduling model is a form of TDM,
but is more or less analogous to an FDM model where each tx-rx pair is allocated a subset
of the spectrum (typically overlapping in some way with other tx-rx pairs in the network).
Transmitting nodes are full buffer in that they always have data to send. Transmissions
are assumed to use Gaussian codebooks and interference from other nodes is treated as
noise. Initially we analyse the model where all transmissions in network i occur at a
common rate of log(1 + βi). We refer to β as the target SINR. Thus a transmission in
network i is successful iff SINR > βi. Later we explore the model where transmission rates
are individually tailored to match the instantaneous capacities of the channels. The signal
power attenuates according to a power law with pathloss exponent α > 2. We assume a
high-SNR or interference limited scenario where the thermal noise is insignificant relative
to the received power of interfering nodes and thus refer to the SIR as the SIR. For a given
realization of the node locations the time-averaged throughput achieved by the jth tx-rx
pair in network i is then
Rj = fjP(SIRj(t) > βi) log(1 + βi)
per complex d.o.f., where fj is the fraction of time the jth tx-rx pair is scheduled. The
average (represented by the bar above the R) is essentially taken over the distribution of
the interference as at different times different subsets of transmitters are scheduled.
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As for α > 2 the bulk of the interference is generated by the strongest interferer, to make
the problem tractable, we compute the SIR as the receive power of the desired signal divided
by the receive power of the nearest interferers signal. We refer to this as the Dominant
Interferer assumption. Denote the range of the nearest interferer to the jth receiver at
time t by rj(t). Then
SIRj(t) =
d−α
r−αj (t)
The metric of interest to each network is its expected time-averaged rate per user,
ER = Eg [fjP(SIRj(t) > βi) log(1 + βi)]
The subscript g indicates this expectation is taken over the geographic distribution of the
nodes. As the setup is statistically symmetric, this metric is equivalent to the expected
sum rate of the system, divided by nλi, in the limit n→∞.
3 Random Access protocol
3.1 Fixed-Rate model
Suppose each network uses the following random access protocol. At each time slot each link
is scheduled i.i.d. with probability pi. The packet size is log(1+βi) for all communications
in network i. The variables βi are optimized over.
Let us first compute the optimal access probability for the case of a single network oper-
ating in isolation on a licensed band, as a function of the node density and the transmission
range. This problem has recently been studied independently in [6]-[9] with equivalent re-
sults derived. In [10] similar results are derived for the case where the SIR is computed
based on all interferers, not just the nearest.
Let the r.v. Nj(x) denote the number of interfering transmitters within range x of the
jth receiver.
ER = Eg
[
fjP(rj(t) > β
1/α
i d) log(1 + βI)
]
= pi
nλi−1∑
k=1
P(Nj(β
1/αd) = k)(1− pi)k log(1 + βi)
= pi
nλi−1∑
k=1
(
piβ
2/α
i d
2
n
)k(
1− piβ
2/α
i d
2
n
)nλi−k−1
×
(
nλi − 1
k
)
(1− pi)k log(1 + βi)
= pi
(
1− pipiβ
2/α
i d
2
n
)nλi−1
log(1 + βi)
→ pi log(1 + βi)e−piλid2piβ
2/α
i
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in the limit n→∞.
In order to obtain better insight into the problem at hand, a change of variables is
required. We refer to the set of all points within the transmission range as the transmission
disc. The quantity piλid
2 is the average number of nodes (tx or rx) per transmission disc.
We often refer to it simply as the number of nodes per disc and represent it by the symbol
Ni , piλid
2.
Assume Ni is larger than a certain threshold (we make this precise later). Maximizing
over the access probability yields
ER→ log(1 + βi)
Niβ
2/α
i
e−1 (1)
with the optimal access probability being
p∗i =
1
Niβ
2/α
i
. (2)
One can further optimize over the target SIR so that βi is replaced by β
∗
i in the above two
equations. Inspection of equation (1) reveals that the optimal target SIR is a function of α
alone. So if we define the quantity
Λi , Nipi,
Λ∗i will be a constant, independent of Ni. The quantity Λi represents the average number of
(simultaneous) transmissions per transmission disc. We sometimes refer to it simply as the
transmit density. Whereas the domain of pi is [0, 1], the domain of Λi is [0, Ni]. Thus we
see that for Ni sufficiently large, the access probability should be set such that an optimal
number of transmissions per disc is achieved. What is this optimal number? What is the
optimal target SIR?
For the purposes of optimizing equation (1), define the function Λ∗(α) as the unique
solution of the following equation
α
2
=
(
1 + Λ∗α/2
)
log
(
1 +
1
Λ∗α/2
)
. (3)
A plot of Λ∗(α) is given in figure 1. So as to avoid confusion, note that the symbol Λ∗
represents a pre-defined function, not necessarily the same as the symbol Λ∗i , which is a
variable. As equation (1) is smooth and continuous with a unique maxima, by setting
it’s derivative to zero we find that the optimal target SIR is β∗ = Λ∗−α/2 and the optimal
number of transmissions per disc is Λ∗i = Λ
∗, when Ni is larger than a certain threshold.
When Ni is smaller than this threshold, there aren’t enough tx-rx pairs to reach the
optimal number of transmissions per disc, even when all of them are simultaneously sched-
uled. In this case the solution lies on the boundary with p∗i = 1. This corresponds to the
scenario where the transmission range is short relative to the node density such that tx-rx
pairs function as if in isolation. It is intuitive that in this case all transmissions in the
network will be simultaneously scheduled. Our discussion is summarized in the following
theorem.
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Figure 1: Optimal average number of transmissions per transmission disc as a function of
the pathloss exponent.
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Theorem 3.1. (Optimal Access Probability) For a single network operating in isolation
under the random access protocol, when Ni > Λ
∗ the optimal access probability is p∗i =
Λ∗
Ni
,
where Λ∗ is given by the unique solution of equation (3). The optimal target SIR is β∗i =
Λ∗−α/2.
When Ni ≤ Λ∗, p∗i = 1 and β∗i is given by the unique solution to
α
2Niβ
∗
i
2/α
=
(
1 +
1
β∗i
)
log(1 + β∗i ).
The region satisfying Ni > Λ
∗ is referred to as the partial reuse regime. The complement
region is referred to as the full reuse regime. Note the optimal access probability of the
above theorem is equivalent to the results of section IV.B in [6], and those discussed under
the title “Maximum Achievable Spatial Throughput and TC” on page 4137 of [8].
Now we perform the same computation for the case where both networks operate on
the same unlicensed band. In this case there is both intra-network and inter-network
interference. It is straightforward to extend the above analysis to show that for network i
ERi → Λi
Ni
log(1 + βi)e
−(Λ1+Λ2)β
2/α
i
in the limit n → ∞. For a given Λ2 the first network can optimize Λ1 and β1, and vice-
versa. That is each network can iteratively adjust its access probability and target SIR
in response to the other networks. In this sense a game can be defined between the two
networks. A strategy for network i is a choice of Λi ∈ [0, Ni] and βi > 0. Its payoff function
(also referred to as utility function) is the limiting form of ERi times Ni,
U1 ((Λ1, β1), (Λ2, β2)) = Λ1 log(1 + β1)e
−(Λ1+Λ2)β
2/α
1 (4)
U2 ((Λ1, β1), (Λ2, β2)) = Λ2 log(1 + β2)e
−(Λ1+Λ2)β
2/α
2 . (5)
Here we have scaled the throughput by Ni to emphasize the simple form of the payoff
functions. At first glance this setup seems desirable but there is a redundancy in the way
the strategy space has been defined. The problem is that the variable βi only appears in
Ui and thus should be optimized over separately rather than being included as part of the
strategy. This leads to the following game setup.
Definition 3.2. (Random Access Game) A strategy for network i in the Random Access
Game is a choice of Λi ∈ [0, Ni]. The payoff functions are
U1(Λ1,Λ2) = max
β1>0
Λ1 log(1 + β1)e
−(Λ1+Λ2)β
2/α
1
U2(Λ1,Λ2) = max
β2>0
Λ2 log(1 + β2)e
−(Λ1+Λ2)β
2/α
2 .
The above formulation is intuitively appealing as a networks choice of access probability
constitutes its entire strategy. If we could explicitly solve the maximization problems, the
variables βi would be removed altogether. When Λ1 and Λ2 are large this can be done and
U1(Λ1,Λ2) ≈ Λ1
(Λ1 + Λ2)α/2
· (α/2)α/2e−α/2 (6)
U2(Λ1,Λ2) ≈ Λ2
(Λ1 + Λ2)α/2
· (α/2)α/2e−α/2, (7)
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but in general it is not possible. Instead, since we are only interested in analyzing the Nash
equilibrium (N.E.) or equilibria of this game, we do the following.
Observe that the objective function within the maximization is smooth and continuous.
This enables the order of maximization to be swapped. That is, for a given Λ2, we first
maximize over Λ1 in equation (4) and then over the β1. Likewise for equation (5). The
benefit of this approach is that the maximizing Λi can be explicitly expressed as a function of
βi. This was demonstrated earlier for the single network scenario. The resulting expressions
are
U1(Λ1,Λ2)
=
{
Λ1 log
(
1 + Λ
−α/2
1
)
e−Λ2/Λ1−1, Λ1 < N1;
maxβ1>0 log(1 + β1)e
−(N1+Λ2)β
2/α
1 , Λ1 = N1.
U2(Λ1,Λ2)
=
{
Λ2 log
(
1 + Λ
−α/2
2
)
e−Λ1/Λ2−1, Λ2 < N2;
maxβ2>0 log(1 + β2)e
−(N2+Λ1)β
2/α
2 , Λ2 = N2.
The set of N.E. of the above game and their corresponding values of U1 and U2 are
identical to those of the Random Access Game. Inspection of the above equations reveals
a further simplification of the problem is at hand —the set of N.E. of the above game are
identical to the set of N.E. of the following game (though the values of U1 and U2 at the
equilibria may be different).
Definition 3.3. (Transformed Random Access Game) A strategy for network i in the
Transformed Random Access Game is a choice of Λi ∈ [0, Ni]. The payoff functions are
U1(Λ1,Λ2) = Λ1 log
(
1 + Λ
−α/2
1
)
e
−
Λ2
Λ1
−1
U2(Λ1,Λ2) = Λ2 log
(
1 + Λ
−α/2
2
)
e
−
Λ1
Λ2
−1
,
We now analyze the N.E. of the Random Access Game by analyzing the N.E. of the
Transformed Random Access Game. The first question of interest is whether or not there
exists a N.E.? It turns out a unique N.E. always exists but its nature depends crucially
on the pathloss exponent. There are two modes, 2 < α < 4 and α > 4. We start with the
first.
Theorem 3.4. (Random Access N.E. for 2 < α < 4) For 2 < α < 4 the unique N.E.
occurs at Λ∗1 = N1, and Λ
∗
2 defined by either the solution of
N1 = Λ2

 α
2
(
1 + Λ2
α/2
)
log
(
1 + Λ2
−α/2
) − 1

 (8)
or N1, whichever is smaller.
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The N.E. described in theorem 3.4 occurs on the boundary of the strategy space. This is
because for 2 < α < 4 each network tries to set its number of transmissions per disc higher
than the other (see the proof of the theorem). The equilibrium is then only attained when
at least one network has maxed out and scheduled all of its transmissions simultaneously.
The N.E. can be better understood when N1 ≫ 1 corresponding to the case in which
transmissions span several intermediate nodes.
Theorem 3.5. (Random Access N.E. for 2 < α < 4 and N1 ≫ 1) In the limit N1 → ∞
the N.E. occurs at
(Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2)
=


(N1, N2), N1 ≤ N2 ≤ 2
α− 2N1(
N1,
2
α− 2N1
)
,
2
α− 2N1 ≤ N2.
This result stems from using the limiting form log(1 + x) → x as x → 0 in the utility
functions U1 and U2, as was done in equations (6) and (7). From it we see that if the
denser network has more than ≈ 2/(α − 2) times as many nodes as its rival, the N.E.
will correspond to partial reuse, i.e. the denser network will only occupy a fraction of the
total available bandwidth. This is in stark contrast to the case of competing individual
transmissions where the N.E. typically corresponds to a full spread, i.e. both competing
links spread their power evenly across the entire bandwidth. The limit result of theorem
?? is plotted in figure 2 as a dashed line.
We now investigate the average throughput at equilibrium for the mode 2 < α < 4. We
define the metric
Ue = U1(Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2) + U2(Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2)
This quantity has a natural interpretation. Recall ERi is the average throughput per tx-rx
pair and Ni is the average number of tx-rx pairs per transmission disc in network i. Thus
Ui = NiERi is the average throughput per transmission disc in network i. This is the
average number of bits successfully received in network i within an area of size pid2 per
time slot, per d.o.f.. The quantity Ue is then the average throughput per transmission disc
in the system, that is, the average number of bits successfully received in both networks
within an area of size pid2 per time slot, per d.o.f..
Theorem 3.6. In the limit N1 →∞
Ue →


c1(α)
N
α/2−1
1
N1 ≤ N2 ≤ 2α−2N1
c2(α)
(N1 +N2)α/2−1
, 2
α−2
N1 ≤ N2.
where c1(α) = (α/2− 1)α/2−1 (α/2)e−α/2 and c2(α) = (α/2)α/2e−α/2.
The important property of this result is that as the number of nodes per transmission disc
increases, Ue decreases roughly like 1/(N1 +N2)
α/2−1. Let us compare this to the average
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Figure 2: The solid line represents the solution to equation (8) for α = 3. The N.E. value
Λ∗2 is equal to the minimum of this line and N2. The limiting solution used in theorem ??
is plotted as a dashed line.
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throughput per transmission disc in the cooperative case, that is when the two networks
behave as if they were a single network with N1 + N2 nodes per disc. From equation (1)
this average throughput per disc is
Uc = Λ
∗ log(1 + Λ∗−α/2)
which is independent of the number of nodes per disc. Thus as the number of nodes per
disc grows, so does the price of anarchy
Uc
Ue
= O
(
N
α/2−1
1
)
.
For α > 4 the N.E. behavior is different. Whereas for 2 < α < 4 the solution always lies
on the boundary, for α > 4 it typically does not.
Theorem 3.7. (Random Access N.E. for α > 4) For α > 4 the unique N.E. occurs at
(Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) = (
√
Λ∗(α/2),
√
Λ∗(α/2))
if
√
Λ∗(α/2) < N1, otherwise Λ
∗
1 = N1 and Λ
∗
2 is defined by either the solution of equation
(8) or N2, whichever is smaller.
A plot of
√
Λ∗(α/2) versus α is given in figure 8. The condition
√
Λ∗(α/2) < N1 corre-
sponds to network 1 having more than
√
Λ∗(α/2) nodes per transmission disc. We refer to
this as the partial/partial reuse regime.
The interpretation of theorem 3.7 is that for α > 4 in the partial/partial reuse regime,
the solution lies in the strict interior of the strategy space. This is because on the boundary
of the space network i can improve its throughput by undercutting the transmit density
of network j, i.e. setting Λi < Λj. The symmetry of the N.E. (Λ
∗
1 = Λ
∗
2) then follows by
observing the utility functions are symmetric and the solution is unique.
There is a cooperative flavor to this equilibrium in that both networks set their transmis-
sion densities to the same level, and this level is comparable to the optimal single network
density Λ∗(α). Moreover the equilibrium level does not grow with the number of nodes
per transmission disc, as it does for 2 < α < 4. Actual cooperation between networks
corresponds to setting the access probability based on equation (2), taking into account
that the effective node density is λ1 + λ2. Thus the cooperative solution is
(Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) =
(
λ1
λ1 + λ2
Λ∗,
λ2
λ1 + λ2
Λ∗
)
.
Under cooperation the average throughput per transmission disc is (from equation (1))
Uc =
1
e
Λ∗(α) log
(
1 +
1
Λ∗(α)α/2
)
.
Under cooperation in the partial/partial reuse regime it is
Ue =
2
e2
√
Λ∗(α/2) log
(
1 +
1
Λ∗(α/2)α/4
)
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Figure 3: These plots can be used to determine which regime the N.E. is in. The x-axis
and y-axis corresponds to the average number of nodes per transmission disc in network 1
and 2, respectively. Note the lower left vertex of the partial/partial reuse regime always
occurs at (
√
Λ∗(α),
√
Λ∗(α)) and the intersection of the full/full reuse regime with the axes
always occurs at (Λ∗(α), 0) and (0,Λ∗(α)).
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Figure 4: For α > 4, the price of anarchy depends only on the pathloss exponent in the
partial/partial reuse regime.
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The price of anarchy is the ratio of these two quantities (Ue/Uc) and is plotted in figure 4.
Comparing the two modes we see that whereas for 2 < α < 4 the price of anarchy grows in
an unbounded fashion with the number of nodes per transmission disc, for α > 4 the price
of anarchy in the partial/partial reuse regime is a constant depending only on α.
We now summarize the equilibria results. There are three regimes.
1. Full/Full reuse
- N1 ≤
√
Λ∗(α/2) and N1 ≤ N2
(
α/2(1 +N2
α/2) log(1 +N2
−α/2)− 1
)
- both networks schedule all transmissions
2. Full/Partial reuse
- N1 ≤
√
Λ∗(α/2) and N1 > N2
(
α/2(1 +N2
α/2) log(1 +N2
−α/2)− 1
)
- denser network schedules all transmissions, sparser schedules only a fraction
3. Partial/Partial reuse
- N1 >
√
Λ∗(α/2)
- both networks schedule only a fraction of their transmissions
In the full/full reuse regime (Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) = (N1, N2). In the full/partial reuse regime the sparser
network sets Λ∗1 = N1 and the denser network sets Λ
∗
2 as the solution to equation (8). In
the partial/partial reuse regime (Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) = (
√
Λ∗(α/2),
√
Λ∗(α/2)).
The regimes are essentially distinguished by which boundary constraints are active. For
2 < α < 4 the partial/partial reuse regime is not accessible. Figure 3 provides an illustrated
means for determining which regime the system is in, for a range of values of the pathloss
exponent. In these plots we consider all values of N1 and N2, not just those satisfying
N1 ≥ N2. Notice that as α→ 2 the entire region corresponds to the full/full reuse regime,
for α = 4 almost the entire region corresponds to the full/partial reuse regime and for
α→∞ the entire region corresponds to the partial/partial reuse regime.
3.2 Variable-Rate model
In this section we examine the case where tx-rx pairs tailor their communication rates to
suit instantaneous channel conditions, sending at rate log(1 + SIR(t)) during the tth time
slot. Various protocols can be used to enable tx-rx pairs to estimate their SIR(t).
Consider first the single, isolated network scenario. The expected time-averaged rate
per user is now
ERi = piE log(1 + SIR).
As before, the rate is both time-averaged over the interference and averaged over the
geographic distribution of the nodes. The SIR is the instantaneous value observed by a
given rx node and is distributed according to
P(SIR > x) = P(r > x1/αd)
=
(
1− pix
2/αd2pi
n
)nλi
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where the variable r denotes the distance to the nearest interferer. Thus
ERi = pi
∫
P (log(1 + SINR) > s) ds
= pi
∫
P (SINR > x)
dx
1 + x
= pi
∫ „ n
pipid
2
«α/2
0
(
1− pix
2/αd2pi
n
)nλi
dx
1 + x
→ pi
∫ ∞
0
e−pipiλid
2x2/α dx
1 + x
in the limit n→∞. Changing variables and optimizing we have
ERi → 1
Ni
max
0≤Λi≤1
Λi
∫ ∞
0
e−Λix
2/α dx
1 + x
. (9)
Define Λ′(α) as the maximizing argument of the unconstrained version of the above opti-
mization problem, or more specifically as the unique solution to∫ ∞
0
1− Λ′x2/α
1 + x
e−Λx
2/α
dx = 0.
The function Λ′(α) is plotted in figure 8. Then
p∗i = min(Λ
′(α)/Ni, 1)
From this we see that the solution for the variable-rate case is the same as the fixed-rate
solution, differing only by substitution of the function Λ′(α) for Λ∗(α).
Now we turn to the case of two competing wireless networks. Using an approach similar
to the one above it can be shown that
ERi → 1
Ni
Λi
∫ ∞
0
e−(Λ1+Λ2)x
2/α dx
1 + x
.
In this way we can define the game between the two networks like so.
Definition 3.8. (Variable Rate Random Access Game) A strategy for network i in the
Variable Rate Random Access Game is a choice of Λi ∈ [0, piλid2]. The payoff functions
are
U1(Λ1,Λ2) = Λ1
∫ ∞
0
e−(Λ1+Λ2)x
2/α dx
1 + x
U2(Λ1,Λ2) = Λ2
∫ ∞
0
e−(Λ1+Λ2)x
2/α dx
1 + x
.
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Figure 5: The utility functions used in the Fixed-Rate model are lower bounds of those
used in the Variable-Rate model. In this sample plot α = 4. The y-axis represents Ui/Λi.
From the above definition we see that the Fixed-Rate game is derived from the Variable-
Rate game by merely applying a step-function lower bound to the players utility functions,
with the width of the step-function optimized, i.e.∫ ∞
0
e−(Λ1+Λ2)x
2/α dx
1 + x
≥ max
βi>0
e−(Λ1+Λ2)β
2/α
i
∫ βi
0
dx
1 + x
= max
βi>0
log(1 + βi)e
−(Λ1+Λ2)β
2/α
i .
A plot comparing the expression on the left as a function of Λ1 + Λ2, to the expression on
the right as a function of Λ1 + Λ2, for α = 4, is presented in figure 5. The figure suggests
that both expressions share a similar functional dependency on Λ1 + Λ2. It is therefore
natural to wonder whether, as a consequence of this close relationship, the N.E. of the
Variable-Rate game bears any relationship to the N.E. of the Fixed-Rate game?
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Figure 6: The total system throughputs at equilibrium for the Variable-Rate and Fixed-
Rate games differ only by α-dependent constants. These constants are plotted above. For
the Variable-Rate game the constant is Γ(α/2+1) versus (α/2)α/2e−α/2 for the Fixed-Rate
game.
As in the Fixed-Rate game, the utility functions of the Variable-Rate game can be
explicitly evaluated when Λ1 and Λ2 are large yielding
U1(Λ1,Λ2) ≈ Λ1
(Λ1 + Λ2)α/2
· Γ(α/2 + 1)
U2(Λ1,Λ2) ≈ Λ2
(Λ1 + Λ2)α/2
· Γ(α/2 + 1).
Comparing with equations (4) and (5) we see that for large Λ1,Λ2, the utility functions
of the Variable-Rate game have exactly the same functional dependency on Λ1,Λ2 as the
utility functions of the Fixed-Rate game, differing only in an α-dependent constant. These
constants are plotted in figure 6. The plots illustrate the benefit in total system throughput
that stems from playing the Variable-rate game in place of the Fixed-Rate game.
As anticipated by the above discussion, the N.E. behavior of the Variable-Rate game
parallels that of the Fixed-Rate game. The same two modes are present, 2 < α < 4 and
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α > 4. These give rise to the same three spreading regimes, the only difference being
that the boundaries delineating them are shifted slightly. The N.E. values (Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) in each
regime take on a similar form.
Theorem 3.9. The Variable-Rate Random Access Game has a unique N.E. (Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) which
lies in one of three regions. Let Λ′′(α) be the unique solution of
∫ ∞
0
1− Λ′′x2/α
1 + x
e−2Λ
′′x2/αdx = 0. (10)
for α > 4, and equal to positive infinity for α ≤ 4.
• (Full/Full reuse) If N1 ≤ Λ′′(α) and N2 ≤ the unique solution over Λ of∫ ∞
0
1− Λx2/α
1 + x
e−(N1+Λ)x
2/α
dx = 0, (11)
then (Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) = (N1, N2).
• (Full/Partial reuse) If N1 ≤ Λ′′(α) and N2 > the unique solution of equation (11)
then Λ∗1 = 1 and Λ
∗
2 is equal to this unique solution.
• (Partial/Partial reuse) If N1 > Λ′′(α) then (Λ∗1,Λ∗2) = (Λ′′(α),Λ′′(α)).
A regime map is provided in figure 7. As is evident from the above theorem, it is not
possible to characterize the behavior of the N.E. for the Variable-Rate game as explicitly
as for the Fixed-Rate game. This is in part due to the more complex representation of
the utility functions in terms of integrals, and in part due to the fact that the the function
Λ′′(α) cannot be represented in terms of the function Λ′(α), as in the case of the Fixed-Rate
game, where one function equals the square-root of the other evaluated at α/2.
For large N1 however, we can use the approximation adopted in theorem ?? to explicitly
characterize the behavior of the N.E. in the full/partial reuse regime.
Theorem 3.10. (Variable-Rate Random Access N.E. for 2 < α < 4 and N1 ≫ 1) In the
limit N1 →∞ the N.E. occurs at
(Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2)
=


(N1, N2), N1 ≤ N2 ≤ 2
α− 2N1(
N1,
2
α− 2N1
)
,
2
α− 2N1 ≤ N2.
Thus for 2 < α < 4 and largeN1, the behavior of the N.E. in the Variable-Rate game is iden-
tical to that of the Fixed-Rate game. As discussed earlier, the values of U1 and U2 at equilib-
rium are equal to those of the Fixed-Rate game times a constant (α/2)α/2e−α/2/Γ(α/2+1).
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3.3 Explanation of Behavior
The intuition behind our result is the following. The average throughput per link is es-
sentially equal to the product of the fraction of time transmissions are scheduled, and the
average number of bits successfully communicated per transmission. Adjusting the trans-
mit density has a linear effect on the former term, but a non-linear effect on the latter. The
latter depends on the SIR and the SIR essentially depends on the pathloss exponent via
SIR ≈
(
distance to transmitter
distance to interferer
)α
When the nearest interferer is closer than the transmitter, the ratio inside the parentheses
is less than one, and a large value of α substantially hurts the SIR, dragging it to near zero
and causing the link capacity to drop to near zero. However, when the nearest interferer
is further away than the transmitter, the ratio is greater than one and a large value of
α substantially improves the SIR, resulting in a large link capacity. Thus for large α the
average number of bits successfully communicated per transmission is very sensitive to
whether or not the transmission disc is empty.
This insensitivity for sufficiently small α means that increasing the transmit density in
network i causes a linear increase in the fraction of time transmissions are scheduled, but
has little effect on the number of bits successfully communicated per transmission, up until
the point where the transmit density of network i starts to dwarf the transmit density of
network j. Thus network i will wish to increase its transmit density until it is sufficiently
larger than network j’s. Likewise network j will wish to increase its transmit density until
it is sufficiently larger than network i’s. Ultimately this results in either
1. a full/full reuse solution, which occurs when the sparser network max’s out and
winds up simultaneously scheduling all of its transmissions, and the denser network
is insufficiently dense such that its optimal transmit density based on the sparser
networks choice, results in it simultaneously scheduling all of its transmissions, or
2. a full/partial reuse solution, which occurs when the sparser network max’s out and
winds up simultaneously scheduling all of its transmissions but the denser network is
sufficiently dense such that its optimal transmit density based on the sparser networks
choice, results in it simultaneously scheduling only a fraction of its transmissions.
The opposite effect occurs for sufficiently large α, where the average number of bits
successfully communicated per transmission depends critically on whether or not there is
an interferer inside the transmission disc. In this scenario network i will set its active
density to a level lower than network j’s, in order to capitalize on those instances in which
network j happens to not schedule any transmissions nearby to one of network i’s receivers,
resulting in the successful communication of a large number of bits. Likewise network j
will set its active density to a level lower than network i’s, and the system converges to the
partial/partial reuse regime.
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4 Variable Transmission Range
One of our initial assumptions was that all tx-rx pairs have the same transmission range
d. In this section we consider the scenario where the transmission ranges of all tx-rx pairs
in the system are i.i.d. random variables Dj. When the variance of Dj is large, some
form of power control may be required to ensure long range transmissions are not unfairly
penalized. A natural form of power control involves tx nodes setting their transmit powers
such that all transmissions are received at the same SNR. This means transmit power scales
proportional to Dαj . Denote the distance from the kth tx node to the jth rx node Dij . Then
the interference power from the kth tx node impinging on the jth rx node is proportional to
Dαkk/D
α
kj. In the fixed transmission range scenario this quantity was proportional to 1/D
α
kj.
There we assumed the bulk of the interference was generated by the dominant interferer.
Denote the scheduled set of tx nodes at time t by A(t). This assumption essentially evoked
the following approximation∑
k∈A(⊔)
1/Dkj(t)
α ≈ max
k∈A(⊔)
1/Dkj(t)
α.
The equivalent approximation for the variable transmission range problem is∑
k∈A(⊔)
Dαkk/Dkj(t)
α ≈ max
k∈A(⊔)
Dαkk/Dkj(t)
α.
Thus for variable range transmission the dominant interferer is not necessarily the nearest
to the receiver. Under this assumption the SIR at the jth rx node at time t is then
SIRj(t) =
D−αk∗k∗
D−αk∗j∗
where k∗ is the index of the tx node that is closest to the jth receiver relative to its
transmission range.
Let us compute the throughput for the variable transmission range model under the
Fixed-Rate Random Access protocol.
ER = piP (SIRj(t) > βi) log(1 + βi).
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The probability the SIR is greater than the threshold
P(SINRj(t) > βi) = P
(
Dkj > β
1/α
i Dkk, ∀k
)
=
(∫ √n/pi/β1/αi
0
P
(
Dkj > β
1/α
i x
)
PDkk(x)dx
)nλ
=
(∫ √n/pi/β1/αi
0
(
1− pipiβ
2/α
i x
2
n
)
PDkk(x)dx
)nλ
=
(
1− pipiβ
2/α
i
n
∫ √n/pi/β1/αi
0
x2PDkk(x)dx
)nλ
=
(
1− pipiβ
2/α
i ED
2
kk
n
)nλ
→ e−pipiβ2/αi ED2kk
as n → ∞. For notational simplicity let d ≡ Dkk. If we define Ni as the average number
of nodes per transmission disc, where the average is taken over both the geographical
distribution of the nodes and the distribution of the size of the transmission disc, i.e.
Ni = piλiE
2
d
we wind up with ER → pi log(1 + βi)e−Nipiβ
2/α
i , which is the same result as the fixed-
transmission range model. It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case of two
competing networks. The throughput per user in network 1 is then
ER→ p1 log(1 + β1)e−(N1p1+N2p2)β
2/α
1 .
Likewise for network 2. From this we see that all results for the fixed-transmission range
model extend to the variable-transmission range model by simply replacing d2 by Ed2.
5 Simulations
5.1 Random Access Protocol
In order to get a sense of the typical behavior of the players in the (Variable-Rate) Random
Access game, and to justify the validity of the Dominant Interferer assumption, we simulate
the behavior of the following greedy algorithm with the interference computed based on all
transmissions in the network, not just the strongest.
Inputs: p1(0), p2(0),∆
Outputs: pi = [pi(1), . . . , pi(500)], for i = 1, 2.
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For t = 1 to 500
Form estimate R1(p1(t− 1) + ∆, p2(t− 1))
Form estimate R1(p1(t− 1)−∆, p2(t− 1))
If R1(p1(t− 1) + ∆, p2(t− 1)) > R1(p1(t− 1)−∆, p2(t− 1))
p1(t) = min(p1(t− 1) + ∆, 1)
Else
p1(t) = max(p1(t− 1)−∆, 0)
End
Form estimate R2(p1(t), p2(t− 1) + ∆)
Form estimate R2(p1(t), p2(t− 1)−∆)
If R2(p1(t), p2(t− 1) + ∆) > R2(p1(t), p2(t− 1)−∆)
p2(t) = min(p2(t− 1) + ∆, 1)
Else
p2(t) = max(p2(t− 1)−∆, 0)
End
End
Each update time t, network 1 temporarily sets its access probability to p1(t−1)+∆ and
measures the resulting throughput, averaged over 200 transmission times. This is denoted
R1(p1(t− 1) + ∆, p2(t− 1)). It then repeats this measurement for an access probability of
p1(t − 1) − ∆. This is denoted R1(p1(t − 1) − ∆, p2(t − 1)). It then either permanently
increases its access probability to p1(t) = p1(t−1)+∆ or permanently decreases it to p1(t) =
p1(t−1)−∆ depending on which option it estimates will lead to a higher throughput. Now
network 2 performs the same operation. It uses a total of 400 time slots to measure the effect
of increasing versus decresing its access probability and then either sets p2(t) = p2(t−1)+∆
or p2(t) = p2(t−1)−∆. If ∆ is small, then both networks can perform these measurement
operations simultaneously without significantly affecting the outcome.
The topology used in the simulations consisted of 400 tx nodes from network 1 and
200 tx nodes from network 2, all i.i.d. uniformly distributed in a square of unit area.
For each tx node, its corresponding rx node was located at a point randomly chosen at
uniform from a disc of radius 0.15. This corresponds to N1 = 400/
√
(800) ≈ 14.14 and
N2 = 200/
√
(800) ≈ 7.28. A step-size of ∆ = 0.02 was used. When computing the
throughputs, in order to avoid boundary effects, only transmissions emanating from those
tx nodes in the interior of the network were counted. The results for α = 2.5, 3.5 and
4.5 are displayed in figure 9. The observed behavior corresponds to the analytical results.
For the values of N1 and N2 used, the N.E. lies in the Full/Full regime for α = 2.5, the
Full/Partial regime for α = 3.5, and the Partial/Partial regime for α = 4.5, as can be seen
from figure 3.
23
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
α = 2.5
iteration number
p1
p2
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
α = 3.5
iteration number
p1
p2
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
α = 4.5
iteration number
p1
p2
Figure 9: Simulations of greedy algorithm under Random Access protocol.
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5.2 Carrier Sensing Multiple Access based protocol
The high level conclusion from our analysis of the Random Access protocol, is that the
Nash Equilibrium is cooperative in nature for a sufficiently high pathloss exponent. Ideally
we would like to be able to draw this conclusion for a more sophisticated class of scheduling
protocols employing carrier sensing. Due to the analytical intractability of the problem, we
present simulation results to illustrate this effect. We assume both networks operate under
the following protocol. We present a centralized version of it due to space constraints, but
claim there exists a distributed version that performs identically in most cases. During the
scheduling phase, each tx-rx pair is assigned a unique token at random from {1, . . . , n}. Tx
nodes proceed with their transmission so long as they will not cause excessive interference
to any rx node with a higher priority token. More precisely, a transmission is scheduled
so long as for each rx node with higher priority, the difference between its received signal
power in dB and the interference power from the lower priority tx node in dB, exceeds a
silencing threshold γi (i = 1 for network 1 and i = 2 for network 2). Thus a game between
the two networks can be defined where the strategies are the choices of silencing thresholds
γ1 and γ2. We refer to this as the CSMA game. The silencing threshold for the CSMA
game essentially plays the same role as the access probability in the Random Access game
-it determines the degree of spatial reuse. A high value of γ leads to a low density of
transmissions, a low value of γ leads to a high density.
We simulate the behavior that arises when both networks optimize their silencing thresh-
olds in a greedy manner. Analogously to before, we have the following algorithm.
Inputs: p1(0), p2(0),∆
Ouputs: pi = [pi(1), . . . , pi(500)], for i = 1, 2.
For t = 1 to 500
Form estimate R1(γ1(t− 1) + ∆, γ2(t− 1))
Form estimate R1(γ1(t− 1)−∆, γ2(t− 1))
If R1(γ1(t− 1) + ∆, γ2(t− 1)) > R1(γ1(t− 1)−∆, γ2(t− 1))
γ1(t) = min(γ1(t− 1) + ∆, 30dB)
Else
γ1(t) = max(γ1(t− 1)−∆,−30dB)
End
Form estimate R2(γ1(t), γ2(t− 1) + ∆)
Form estimate R2(γ1(t), γ2(t− 1)−∆)
If R2(γ1(t), γ2(t− 1) + ∆) > R2(γ1(t), γ2(t− 1)−∆)
γ2(t) = min(γ2(t− 1) + ∆, 30dB)
Else
γ2(t) = max(γ2(t− 1)−∆,−30dB)
25
End
End
The topology used in the setup is identical to before, the only exception being that at
each iteration of the algorithm, 10 old tx-rx pairs leave each network, and 10 new pairs
join in i.i.d. locations drawn uniformly at random. This is to ensure sufficient averaging.
In a similar fashion to before, each network estimates the effect of either increasing
or decreasing the silencing threshold and then makes a permanent choice. For the same
parameter values, the results of the simulation are displayed in figure 10. On the y-axes of
these plots we have drawn the fraction of nodes simultaneously scheduled at each iteration,
which we denote f1 and f2, rather than the silencing thresholds γi, in order to draw a simple
visual comparison with figure 9. For this reason there is more fluctuation in the results, as
the fraction of simultaneously scheduled transmissions varies not only due to the up/down
movements of the silencing thresholds, but also due to the changing topology.
We conclude from these plots that for small values of α (namely α = 2.5) the system
converges to a competitive equilibrium, where both networks simultaneously schedule a
large fraction of their transmissions, and for large values of α (namely α = 3.5 and 4.5) the
system converges to a near cooperative equilibrium, where both networks schedule a small
fraction of their transmissions.
6 Conclusion
This work studied spectrum sharing between wireless devices operating under a random
access protocol. The crucial assumption made was that nodes belonging to the same
network or coalition cooperate with one another. Competition only exists between nodes
belonging to rival networks. It was found that cooperation between devices within each
network created the necessary incentive to prevent total anarchy. For pathloss exponents
greater than four, we showed that contrary to ones intuition, there can be a natural incentive
for devices to cooperate to the extent that each occupies only a fraction of the available
bandwidth. Such results are optimistic and encouraging. We demonstrated via simulations
that it may be possible to extend them to more complex operating protocols such as those
that employ carrier-sensing to determine when the medium is free. More generally one
wonders whether a multi-stage game capturing the system dynamics under such a protocol
can be formulated, and whether the desirable properties of the single-stage game continue
to hold. It would also be worthwhile investigating the incentives wireless links have to
form coalitions, as in this work it was in essence assumed that coalitions had been pre-
determined.
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Figure 10: Simulations of greedy algorithm under Carrier Sensing Multiple Access protocol
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7 Proofs
7.1 Theorem 3.1
The limiting expression for the average throughput is
ER(pi, βi)→ pi log(1 + βi)e−Nipiβ
2/α
i .
Given a βi there is a single maximum over pi. By differentiation we have
∂ER
∂pi
=
(
1− piNiβ2/αi
)
log(1 + βi)e
−Nipiβ
2/α
i ,
so p∗i = min(1, 1/Niβ
2/α
i ). Thus
ER(p∗i , βi) =


log(1 + βi)e
−Niβ
2/α
i , βi ≤ N−2/αi ,
log(1 + βi)e
−1
Niβ
2/α
i
, βi > N
−2/α
i .
Both of these functions have one maximum, but the maximum of the second function is
always greater than the maximum of the first as it represents the solution to the uncon-
strained problem
max
pi>0,βi>0
ER(pi, βi),
whereas the maximum of the first represents the solution to
max
pi=1,βi>0
ER(pi, βi).
Thus if the maximum of the second function occurs for βi > N
−2/α
i , it is the maximum of
the entire function, but if it occurs for βi ≤ N−2/α, the maximum of the entire function is
the maximum of the first function over the domain βi ≤ N−2/α. By differentiation we find
the maximum of the second function occurs at the unique solution of
α
2
= (1 + 1/βi) log(1 + βi)
which is βi = Λ
∗−α/2. Thus if Ni > Λ
∗, the solution is p∗ = Λ∗/Ni and β
∗
i = Λ
∗−α/2. If
Ni ≤ Λ∗ the solution is p∗ = 1 and β∗i equal to the unique solution of
α
2Niβ
2/α
i
= (1 + 1/βi) log(1 + βi) (12)
or N
−2/α
i , whichever is smaller. But as (1 + 1/x) log(1 + x) is a monotonically increasing
function, from the definition of Λ∗ we have
α
2
≤
(
1 +N
α/2
i
)
log
(
1 +N
−α/2
i
)
whenever Ni ≤ Λ∗. Combining this with equation (12) and using the monotonicity of
(1+1/x) log(1+x) we see that the unique solution to equation (12) is always smaller than
N
−2/α
i . This establishes the desired result.
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7.2 Theorem 3.4
First we show that any N.E. must lie on the boundary of the strategy space, i.e. Λi = 1 for
some i. The utility functions are smooth and continuous. Differentiating U1 with respect
to Λ1 yields
∂U1
∂Λ1
= e−Λ2/Λ1

Λ2
Λ1
− α
2
(
1 + Λ
α/2
1
)
log
(
1 + Λ
−α/2
1
) + 1


Consider the function f(x) = (1+ x) log(1+ 1/x). As f(x) is monotonically decreasing for
x ≥ 0 and limx→∞ f(x) = 1 we have f(x) > 1 for all x ≥ 0. Thus for α < 4, ∂U1/∂Λ1 > 0
whenever Λ1 < Λ2 and similarly ∂U2/∂Λ2 > 0 whenever Λ2 < Λ1. Thus for a N.E. to occur
in the interior of the strategy space we must have both Λ1 > Λ2 and Λ2 > Λ1. As these
conditions are mutually exclusive at least one of the constraints of the strategy space must
be active at the N.E.. In essence each network is trying to set it’s active density higher
than the other’s. Eventually at least one network maxs out.
First consider the case where the solution to
N1 = x
(
α
2 (1 + xα/2) log (1 + x−α/2)
− 1
)
. (13)
occurs for x < N2. Suppose Λ
∗
2 = N2. Then as N1 ≤ N2 we have Λ1 ≤ Λ∗2, hence
∂U1/∂Λ1 > 0 for all Λ1 on the interior and hence Λ
∗
1 = N1. Now the function U2(Λ
∗
1,Λ2)
has a unique maximum for Λ2. This maximum satisfies ∂U2(Λ
∗
1,Λ2)∂Λ2 = 0, which is
equation (13) with Λ∗2 substituted for x. But the solution equation (13) satisfies x < N2, so
Λ∗2 < N2, a contradiction. Thus the constraint Λ2 ≤ N2 must be inactive. Suppose instead
that the constraint Λ∗1 = N1 is active. Then by the same arguments the unique Λ
∗
2 satisfies
equation (13). This establishes the solution and it’s uniqueness, for the first case.
Second consider the case where the solution to equation (13) occurs for x ≥ N2. Then it
is straightforward to check using similar arguments above, that the unique solution satisfies
(Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) = (N1, N2). This establishes the result.
7.3 Theorem 3.5
For α > 2 the solution to equation (8) only goes to infinity for N1 → ∞. In this limit
(1 + Λ∗2
α/2) log(1 + Λ∗2
−α/2)→ 1 and
Λ∗2 →
2
α− 2Λ
∗
1
if N1 ≤ (α/2 − 1)N2. Otherwise, Λ∗2 = N2. Computing p∗i = Λ∗i /Ni produces the stated
result.
7.4 Theorem 3.6
This follows by direct substitution.
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7.5 Theorem 3.7
The proof of this result is more involved than the proof of theorem 2.3. There are three
regimes.
First consider the joint spread regime where N1 >
√
Λ∗(α/2). We show that a N.E.
cannot occur on the boundary of the strategy space. Suppose Λ∗1 = N1. Then Λ
∗
1 >√
Λ∗(α/2). As
√
Λ∗(α/2) is the solution to the equation
α
2
(
1 +
√
Λ∗(α/2)
α/2
)
log
(
1 +
√
Λ∗(α/2)
−α/2
) − 1 = 1.
and (1 + x) log(1 + 1/x) is a monotonically decreasing function for x > 0, we have
α
2
(
1 + Λ∗1
α/2
)
log
(
1 + Λ∗1
−α/2
) − 1 > 1.
If Λ∗1 lies on the boundary of the strategy space then ∂U1(Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2)/∂Λ1 > 0 which implies
Λ∗2 > Λ
∗
1

 α
2
(
1 + Λ∗1
α/2
)
log
(
1 + Λ∗1
−α/2
) − 1


> Λ∗1
>
√
Λ∗(α/2).
This in turn implies
α
2
(
1 + Λ∗2
α/2
)
log
(
1 + Λ∗2
−α/2
) − 1 > 1.
At equilibrium ∂U2(Λ
∗
1,Λ2)/∂Λ2 ≥ 0 so
Λ∗1 ≥ Λ∗2

 α
2
(
1 + Λ∗2
α/2
)
log
(
1 + Λ∗2
−α/2
) − 1


> Λ∗2,
a contradiction. Thus Λ1 < N1. Now assume Λ2 = N2. By assumption N2 ≥ N1 so
Λ∗2 >
√
Λ∗(α/2). By repeating the same arguments we can generate the same style of
contradiction and thus Λ2 < N2. This establishes that a N.E. cannot occur on the boundary
of the strategy space. In essence each network is trying to undercut the active density of
the other. This drags the equilibrium away from the boundary.
Now we establish any N.E. must be symmetric, i.e. Λ∗1 = Λ
∗
2. Suppose a N.E. (Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2)
with Λ∗1 6= Λ∗2 exists. Then as it must lie on the interior of the strategy space and as
the utility functions are symmetric, (Λ∗2,Λ
∗
1) must also be a N.E.. On the interior of the
strategy space the N.E. criterion is ∂U1(Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2)/∂Λ1 = 0 and so the function Λ
∗
1(Λ2) is
monotonically increasing in Λ2. But this implies we cannot have N.E. at both (Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2) and
(Λ∗2,Λ
∗
1), a contradiction. Thus Λ
∗
1 = Λ
∗
2.
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By differentiating the utility functions this implies that at any N.E. Λ∗1 satisfies
α
2
(
1 + Λ∗1
α/2
)
log
(
1 + Λ∗1
−α/2
) − 1 = 1
with Λ∗2 = Λ
∗
1. But this is equivalent to Λ
∗
1 =
√
Λ∗(α/2). Thus the N.E. is unique and
occurs at (Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) = (
√
Λ∗(α/2),
√
Λ∗(α/2)).
Next consider the partial spread and full spread regimes where N1 ≤
√
Λ∗(α/2). We
first show that Λ∗1 = N1. Suppose Λ
∗
1 < N1. Then Λ
∗
1 <
√
Λ∗(α/2) which implies
α
2
(
1 + Λ∗1
α/2
)
log
(
1 + Λ∗1
−α/2
) − 1 < 1.
At equilibrium ∂U1/∂Λ1 = 0 so
Λ∗2 = Λ
∗
1

 α
2
(
1 + Λ∗1
α/2
)
log
(
1 + Λ∗1
−α/2
) − 1


< Λ∗1
<
√
Λ∗(α/2).
But this in turn implies
α
2
(
1 + Λ∗2
α/2
)
log
(
1 + Λ∗2
−α/2
) − 1 < 1
which in conjunction with the equilibrium condition ∂U2/∂Λ2 = 0 implies Λ
∗
1 < Λ
∗
2, a
contradiction. Thus Λ∗1 = N1. Now we can solve for Λ
∗
2 to conclude that Λ
∗
2 is the unique
solution to equation (8) or N2, whichever is smaller. This concludes the proof.
7.6 Theorem 3.9
We first tackle the full spread and partial spread regimes. It is shown in lemma 8.4 in
the appendix that Λ′′(α) is undefined for α ≤ 4 and recall Λ′′(α) is defined to be positive
infinity for α > 4. Consider the case where N1 ≤ Λ′′(α). We show that Λ∗1 = N1. Suppose
the contrary, that Λ∗1 < N1. Then Λ
∗
1 < Λ
′′(α). Define the function
f(s1, s2) ,
∫∞
0
e−(s1+s2)x
2/α dx
1 + x
s1
∫∞
0
x2/αe−(s1+s2)x2/α
dx
1 + x
,
for s1 and s2 positive. In Lemma 8.1 in the appendix it is shown that f(s, s) is a mono-
tonically decreasing function in s. By rearranging equation (10) one can check that
f(Λ′′(α),Λ′′(α)) = 1. Thus f(Λ∗1,Λ
∗
1) > 1. For a given Λ2 it is shown in Lemma 8.2
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in the appendix that the utility function U1(Λ1,Λ2) is a smooth continuous function of Λ1
with a unique maximum (and likewise for U2 given Λ1). As Λ
∗
1 < N1 the maximum with
respect to Λ1 occurs at ∂U1(Λ
∗
1,Λ2)/∂Λ1 = 0. By rearranging equation (11) one can check
that this condition is equivalent to f(Λ∗1,Λ2) = 1. This means f(Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2) < f(Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
1). In
lemma 8.2 we show that f(s1, s2) is a monotonically increasing function in s2 given s1. Thus
we have Λ∗2 < Λ
∗
1 and so also Λ
∗
2 < Λ
′′(α) and Λ∗2 < N1. Thus f(Λ
∗
2,Λ
∗
2) > 1. As by assump-
tion N1 ≤ N2, we have Λ∗2 < N2 and so the maximum of U2 occurs at ∂U2(Λ1,Λ∗2)/∂Λ2 = 0.
This means f(Λ∗2,Λ
∗
1) = 1 < f(Λ
∗
2,Λ
∗
2) which implies Λ
∗
1 < Λ
∗
2. This is a contradiction.
Thus we must have Λ∗1 = N1 at a N.E.. By maximizing over Λ2 via differentiation of U2, we
see that Λ∗2 equals the solution of (11) or N2 whichever is smaller. Lemma 8.2 establishes
the solution of (11) always exists and is unique.
Now consider the case where N1 > Λ
′′(α). We first show that a N.E. cannot occur on
the boundary of the strategy space. Suppose Λ∗1 = N1. Then Λ1 > Λ
′′(α). This implies
f(Λ∗1,Λ
∗
1) < 1. As Λ
∗
1 = N1 the maximum of U1 occurs at ∂U1(Λ
∗
1,Λ2)/∂Λ1 ≥ 0 for a given
Λ2. This means f(Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2) ≥ 1 > f(Λ∗1,Λ∗1), thus Λ∗2 > Λ∗1. We also then have Λ∗2 > Λ′′(α).
From the optimality condition for network 2 we then have ∂U2(Λ
∗
1,Λ2)/∂Λ2 ≥ 0. This
means f(Λ∗2,Λ
∗
1) ≥ 1 > f(Λ∗2,Λ∗2) which implies Λ∗1 > Λ∗2. This is a contradiction. Thus we
must have Λ∗1 < N1. As N2 ≥ N1 > Λ′′(α) we can repeat the argument for Λ∗2 to conclude
that we must also have Λ∗2 < N2. This proves a N.E. can only occur on the interior of the
strategy space.
Now we establish any N.E. must be symmetric, i.e. Λ∗1 = Λ
∗
2. Suppose a N.E. (Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2)
with Λ∗1 6= Λ∗2 exists. Then as it must lie on the interior of the strategy space and as
the utility functions are symmetric, (Λ∗2,Λ
∗
1) must also be a N.E.. On the interior of the
strategy space the N.E. criterion is ∂U1(Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2)/∂Λ1 = 0 and so the function Λ
∗
1(Λ2) is
monotonically increasing in Λ2 by lemma 8.3. But this implies we cannot have N.E. at
both (Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) and (Λ
∗
2,Λ
∗
1), a contradiction. Thus Λ
∗
1 = Λ
∗
2.
Finally one can verify that Λ∗1 = Λ
∗
2 = Λ
′′(α) is a N.E. by differentiating the utility
functions. Thus the unique N.E. is (Λ∗1,Λ
∗
2) = (Λ
′′(α),Λ′′(α)).
In essence what is going on here is that in the absence of strategy space constraints,
when Λi < Λ
′′(α), network i wants to set Λi > Λj and when Λi > Λ
′′(α) network i wants to
set Λi < Λj. Thus the natural equilibrium is at (Λ
∗
1,Λ
∗
2) = (Λ
′′(α),Λ′′(α)). The problem for
α < 4 is Λ′′(α) is infinite and the sparser network winds up maxing out at Λ∗1 = N1. When
α > 4 the function Λ′′(α) is finite and it is possible to have N1 > Λ
′′(α), i.e. both networks
have a sufficiently high density of nodes so as not to be constrained by the strategy space.
In this case they get to set their access probabilities so as to achieve the natural equilibrium.
8 Appendix
Lemma 8.1. The function f(s, s) is monotonically decreasing in s.
Proof. By changing variables we can rewrite f(s, s) as
f(s, s) ,
∫∞
0
gs(x)dx∫∞
0
xgs(x)dx
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where
gs(x) =
xα/2−1e−2x
sα/2 + xα/2
.
Choose a pair of values for s1 and s2 satisfying 0 ≤ s1 ≤ s2 and then observe that for any
x1 ≤ x2 the following inequality holds
gs2(x2)
gs1(x2)
≥ gs2(x1)
gs1(x1)
.
Thus∫ ∞
0
∫ x2
0
(x2 − x1)gs1(x1)gs2(x2)dx1dx2 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
x1
(x2 − x1)gs1(x1)gs2(x2)dx2dx1
=
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
x2
(x1 − x2)gs1(x2)gs2(x1)dx1dx2
≥
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
x2
(x1 − x2)gs1(x1)gs2(x2)dx1dx2.
Then ∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
(x2 − x1)gs1(x1)gs2(x2)dx1dx2 ≥ 0
and so ∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
x2gs1(x1)gs2(x2)dx1dx2 ≥
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
x1gs1(x1)gs2(x2)dx1dx2
which implies ∫ ∞
0
gs1(x)dx
∫ ∞
0
xgs2(x)dx ≥
∫ ∞
0
xgs1(x)dx
∫ ∞
0
gs2(x)dx
and thus f(s1, s1) ≥ f(s2, s2).
Lemma 8.2. The function
Ui(Λ1,Λ2) = Λi
∫ ∞
0
e−(Λ1+Λ2)x
2/α dx
1 + x
is smooth and continuous in Λi with a unique maximum Λ
∗
i .
Proof. As the integral is well-defined for all positive Λ1 and Λ2, the function is smooth
and continuous by inspection. To see that a unique maximum exists set the derivative
to zero to obtain f(Λi,Λj) = 1. For fixed Λj it is straightforward to show f(Λi,Λj) is
monotonically decreasing in Λi using arguments similar to those in lemma 8.1. For Λi → 0
we find f(Λi,Λj)→∞ and for Λi →∞ we find f(Λi,Λj)→ 2/α which is always less than
1 for α > 2. Thus there always exists a single Λ∗i satisfying f(Λ
∗
i ,Λj) = 1 and hence a
unique maximum always exists.
Lemma 8.3. The function f(s1, s2) is monotonically increasing in s2 given s1.
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Proof. The proof mirrors that of lemma 8.1, the only difference being that now
gs2(x2)
gs1(x2)
≤ gs2(x1)
gs1(x1)
,
i.e. the inequality goes the other way. We omit the details for brevity.
Lemma 8.4. The function Λ′′(α) is undefined for α ≤ 4 and uniquely defined for α > 4.
Proof. Λ′′(α) is the solution to f(Λ′′(α),Λ′′(α)) = 1. The function f(s, s) is a monotonically
decreasing in s by lemma 8.1. By taking s→ 0 we find f(s, s)→∞ and by taking s→∞
we find f(s, s) → 4/α. Thus when α ≤ 4 there is no s for which f(s, s) = 1 and hence
Λ′′(α) is undefined. When α > 4 there is a single s at which f(s, s) crosses the value 1 and
hence Λ′′(α) is uniquely defined.
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